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Evidence that firms adjust accruals to just meet or beat analyst forecasts is 
pervasive. However, the implications for earnings quality are not clear. Managers can use 
this practice either to mislead investors, resulting in lower quality earnings, or to signal 
future earnings growth and thereby improve the decision usefulness of earnings. Assuming 
that boards are concerned about providing higher quality financial information and that 
they can discern the proper earnings signal, they should discourage managers from 
adjusting earnings to beat the analyst forecast target if such adjustment diminishes earnings 
quality. Consistent with this prediction, I find a significantly negative relation between the 
probability that a firm beats the target by adjusting accruals and the presence of at least one 
independent audit committee financial expert for firms with poor future performance. I also 
find that the negative impact of an independent financial expert on the odds of beating the 
target by adjusting accruals is significantly stronger for firms with poor future performance 
than for firms with strong future performance. These findings are consistent with financial 
expertise on the audit committees improving corporate governance by protecting 
shareholders from accruals management that reduces the decision usefulness of earnings. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Considerable research has been devoted to documenting and understanding the 
importance of “just meeting or beating” the consensus analyst forecast.1 For example, 
several studies document evidence that managers adjust accruals in order to beat 
consensus analyst forecast targets (Arya et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006), which is 
consistent with the evidence that managers have incentives to do so (Bergstresser et al., 
2006; Cheng et al., 2005; Matsumoto, 2002; Matsunaga et al., 2001; McVay et al., 
2006).2 However, it is not clear whether adjusting accruals to beat the target increases or 
decreases earnings quality. It is also not clear how the board views such behavior or how 
board member characteristics influence management’s tendency to use accruals to beat 
the target. To provide evidence on these issues, I examine whether the presence of 
financial experts on the audit committee affects the use of accruals to beat analyst 
forecast targets conditional on the impact of accruals on the earnings quality.  
 Using accruals to beat the analyst forecast target could either increase or decrease 
the quality of earnings, depending on the nature of management’s private information. 
Adjusting accruals to beat the target would increase the information value of earnings 
when managers use accruals to signal private favorable information about future 
performance. On the other hand, when managers have private information that the firm 
                                                          
1
 Hereafter, I use “beat” the consensus analyst forecast target to refer to “just meet or beat” the 
analyst forecast target. 
 
2
 Firms can also guide analyst forecasts downward to avoid missing targets (Matsumoto, 2002). I 
do not examine expectation management as a mechanism to exceed analyst forecasts because it is 
strictly a reporting strategy and does not affect the quality of earnings. 
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will not be able to sustain its performance in the future, adjusting accruals upward to beat 
the target could provide an overly optimistic view of the firm and mislead shareholders. 
Prior research suggests that board members monitor the financial reporting 
process and that higher quality boards increase earnings quality. Consistent with this 
view, several studies document a positive association between board quality and earnings 
quality (Ahmed et al., 2007; Beasley, 1996; Farber, 2005). This implies that the board 
should encourage or discourage accruals management to beat analyst targets depending 
on whether the adjustment properly reflects management’s private information, namely, 
allowing firms to adjust accruals to beat the analyst forecast if they expect future 
financial performance to be good and object if they expect poor future performance. This 
is consistent with boards protecting shareholders by monitoring the quality of financial 
information presented by the firm.  
 However, this assumes that board members have sufficient knowledge and 
expertise to evaluate managers’ private information, and there is evidence that the extent 
of financial expertise is not consistent across boards. Regulators have expressed concerns 
regarding whether directors have sufficient knowledge to effectively monitor the 
financial reporting process (Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Cmmittees, 1999; General Accounting Office [GAO], 1991; Public 
Oversight Board, 1993; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [SOX], 2002). Academic research 
also supports this view by showing a positive relation between appropriate expertise on 
the audit committee and the financial reporting quality.3 As a result, in this paper I argue 
                                                          
3
 Krishnan et al. (2008) find that only accounting financial experts is positively and significantly 
correlated with accounting conservatism while nonaccounting expert is unrelated with accounting 
conservatism. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that the combination of both accounting and financial 
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that the presence of a financial expert—someone who has an understanding of generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), has the experience in preparing, auditing, 
analyzing or evaluating financial statements, and who has the ability to access the 
accounting principle or has an understanding of internal controls and procedures for 
financial reporting (SEC, 2003)—is more likely to have sufficient knowledge to assess 
managers’ private information about future performance.4  
 I expect that, when managers have negative private information regarding future 
earnings, financial expert directors on the audit committee will discourage managers from 
manipulating accruals to beat analyst forecast targets. On the other hand, when managers 
have positive private information regarding future earnings, the financial expert will not 
intervene and will allow managers to use accruals to produce earnings above the analyst 
forecast. Empirically, I first predict that for firms that have strong future performance, I 
would observe a negative relation between the presence of a financial expert on the audit 
committee and the likelihood that a firm adjusts accruals to beat the analyst forecast 
target. In addition, I predict that the impact of a financial expert on the use of accruals 
management to beat the target will be stronger for firms that have strong future 
performance than for firms that have poor future performance. 
 To test these hypotheses, I use earnings surprises in quarter t+1 as a proxy for 
future earnings performance. I create an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm has 
                                                                                                                                                                             
experts has most positive effect on accruals quality while the presence of at least supervisory 
experts is not related to higher quality of accruals.  
4 Following the SEC, a director is defined as a financial expert if he/she has work experience as a 
certified public accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, financial controller, accounting officer, 
investment banker, financial analyst, or CEO or company president. See detailed discussion in 
later section.  
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earnings below analyst forecast in quarter t+1 and, zero otherwise (BadNEWS).5,6 I also 
construct a measure to capture financial experts’ monitoring as defined by Section 407 of 
SOX.7 I create an indicator variable which equals 1 if there is at least one independent 
audit committee financial expert (FEDIR1), and zero otherwise.  
 My sample is based on firms with financial data available from COMPUSTAT for 
the years 2004 to 2011. I identify 1,460 firm-quarter observations that initially had 
earnings before discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995) below analyst forecasts by 
less than one cent. Presumably, firms missing forecasts by less than one cent should be 
capable of adjusting accruals to beat the target. Of 1,460 observations that are likely to 
fall below the target, 1,091 observations recognize enough amounts of positive 
discretionary accruals and report earnings that are above analyst forecasts, while 369 
observations do not adjust earnings upward and therefore miss the target. I estimate a 
logit regression if the firm adjusted accruals to beat the target, and zero if the firm chose 
to miss the target. By interacting the future performance measure (BadNEWS) with the 
financial expert measures (FEDIR1), I capture the differential impact of the presence of 
at least one audit committee financial expert on the odds of beating the target for firms 
with negative earnings surprises in quarter t+1. 
                                                          
5
 I also use change in earnings from the same quarter of the prior year to capture future financial 
performance. The qualitative results remain unchanged.  
 
6
 I calculate earnings surprises in quarter t+1 by using the last consensus forecasts before earnings 
are released in quarter t in order to make sure that quarter t+1’s analyst forecast is not affected by 
quarter t's earnings surprises.  
 
7
 Section 407 of SOX requires firms to disclose whether there is at least one financial expert on 
their audit committee. The firms need to provide an explanation if they do not include at least one 
financial expert on their audit committee.  
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 Consistent with my expectation, after controlling for variables that may be 
correlated with the odds of beating the analyst forecast, I find that when a firm’s next 
quarter's earnings fall below the analyst forecast, the firm is less likely to adjust earnings 
upward to beat the targets when there is at least one independent audit committee 
financial expert. The results also support my hypothesis that the impact of financial 
experts on the odds of beating targets by accruals is stronger for firms that have poor 
future performance than for firms that have strong performance. I find that the effect of 
an independent financial expert on the incidence of accruals management to beat the 
target is significantly stronger for firms whose earnings in the next quarter fall below the 
analyst forecast.8  
 While the prior results apply to financial experts, I also investigate whether the 
results are driven by accounting expertise on the audit committee. One of the most 
controversial SOX provisions regarding financial experts is whether financial experts 
should include both accounting and nonaccounting experts. The SEC’s original proposal 
adopts a narrow definition of financial expertise that focuses on whether the director has 
prior accounting-related experience with financial reporting, such as experience as a 
public accountant, auditor, principal financial or accounting officer, or controller. 
However, due to widespread criticism of the narrow definition, the SEC broadened the 
definition in its final version to extend the field of qualified experts to include company 
presidents and CEOs. Because of the controversy surrounding the SEC’s definition of 
financial expertise, prior studies examine the effects of accounting and nonaccounting 
financial expertise on financial reporting quality. However, the results are mixed. For 
                                                          
8 I fail to find any significant relation between the presence of at least an independent financial 
expert and the odds of beating targets by adjusting accruals for firms that have positive earnings 
surprises in the next quarter.  
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example, although Krishnan et al. (2008) find that accounting conservatism is not 
correlated with nonaccounting financial expertise or nonfinancial expertise, Zhang et al. 
(2007) find that both accounting and nonaccounting experts negatively affect the 
possibility of internal control weakness. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) also find that the mix of 
accounting and nonaccounting financial expertise has the most positive impact on 
accruals quality. 
 Consistent with the findings from prior studies (Dhaliwal, et al., 2010; Zhang et 
al., 2007), I find that the presence of both independent accounting experts and 
independent nonaccounting financial experts is related to lower possibility of using 
accruals to beat the target for firms with negative earnings surprises in quarter t+1. This 
evidence implies that the broad definition of financial expertise might reflect the needs of 
both accounting (CPA or accountant) and nonaccounting expertise (investment banker, 
CEO or president).  
  All of the prior results are based on a small group of firms that have earnings 
before accruals that just miss the analyst forecast. In order to make my results more 
generalizable, instead of focusing on firms that use accruals to beat the analyst forecast, I 
examine the overall predictive ability of accruals. I predict that financial experts will 
protect shareholders by discouraging the use of positive accruals if the firm is unable to 
sustain its future earnings, while financial experts will allow positive accruals if the firm 
performs strongly in the future. Thus, when audit committee financial experts effectively 
monitor managers, current accruals should be more highly correlated to future earnings. 
Following Sloan (1996), I estimate the ability of accruals and cash flows of current 
earnings to predict future earnings. I find that when firms have at least one independent 
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financial expert on the audit committee, the current quarter's accruals are more closely 
related to next quarter's earnings.  
 While my findings suggest that financial experts discourage management from 
using accruals to beat analyst forecast if future performance is expected to be poor, prior 
studies generally show that there is an unconditionally negative relation between board 
quality and the magnitude of accruals (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003).9 In order to 
reconcile my results to prior studies, I first replicate prior studies. Consistent with Klein 
(2002) and Xie et al. (2003), I find that that the number of independent directors and 
independent audit committee members are negatively related to the magnitude of 
unconditional discretionary accruals. Then, I investigate whether the presence of at least 
one independent financial expert unconditionally affects the magnitude of accruals. I fail 
to find any significant relation between the presence of at least one independent financial 
expert and the unconditional use of accruals. The insignificant results seem to be 
consistent with my main findings that the impact of the financial expert on the use of 
accruals is contingent upon managers’ information.10    
                                                          
9 Prior studies argue that because accrual management destroys the quality of earnings, boards of 
directors should prohibit the use of accruals. In this paper, I do not assume than accruals 
management always diminishes the decision usefulness of earnings. Instead, I argue that the 
negative relation between board or audit committee independence and the magnitude of accruals 
is driven by the fact that directors without detailed financial expertise are unable to determine 
managers’ private information. Thus, they unconditionally discourage the use of accruals.  
 
10 My hypotheses suggest that financial experts are able to assess future performance and will 
discourage the use of accruals when it destroys the decision usefulness of earnings. When future 
performance is expected to be poor, financial experts will discourage management from 
recognizing “positive” accruals. On the other hand, it is possible that financial experts will 
discourage the recognition of “negative” accruals. For example, managers may use accruals to 
decrease earnings due to their private incentives to smooth income (Defond et al, 1997; Grant et 
al., 2009), even they know the future performance is strong, financial experts Thus, on average 
financial experts should not unconditionally intervene in the recognition of accruals. 
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 I conduct several sensitivity tests to validate the measurement of the financial 
experts’ monitoring. In my main tests, I ask whether there is at least one independent 
financial expert to capture financial experts’ monitoring as defined by Section 407 of the 
SOX. In the sensitivity test, I first test whether the presence of exactly one independent 
financial expert matters. I drop all observations with more than one financial expert on 
the audit committee and find that the presence of exactly one independent financial 
expert negatively affects the use of accruals to beat the analyst forecast for firms with 
poor future performance. I then investigate whether there is any additional value of 
having more than one financial expert on the audit committee. I find that firms with more 
than one financial expert on the audit committee are less likely to beat the target through 
adjusting accruals when the future performance is predicted to be poor. I also use the 
number of independent financial experts on the audit committee and the percentage of 
independent financial experts on the audit committee to proxy financial experts’ 
monitoring, and find results that are similar with my main findings.  
 Lastly, I perform several tests that attempt to discern whether the documented 
effect is caused by the possibility that financial experts are drawn to firms with better 
accruals quality. Instead of monitoring firms’ accruals management practice, financial 
expert directors choose firms with a better financial reporting process. To address this 
concern, I first lag the financial expert variables by one period and use the lagged value 
as an instrument in regressions of the odds of beating the analyst forecast (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991), and find a similar result. I also perform a two-stages least squares 
estimation (2SLS). My first-stage model captures the determinants of the presence of at 
least one independent audit committee financial expert, including monitoring or advising 
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costs, information asymmetry, business complexity, and CEO characteristics. In the 
second stage, I replace the financial expert measurement (whether there is at least one 
independent audit committee financial expert) with the predicted value from the first-
stage model. All of the results remain quantitatively similar.  
 My study contributes to literature in several ways. First, my study is of interest to 
academic researchers who study earnings management concerning analyst forecast 
benchmarks. I provide a possible explanation for why some firms do not adjust accruals 
to beat analyst forecasts. While there is considerable research which documents that 
managers have incentives to use accruals to beat the analyst forecast target, less attention 
is paid to the firms that fail to beat the target. In particular, the reasons why managers 
would choose not to adjust accruals and miss analyst forecasts when they are capable of 
doing so is not well understood. In this paper, I provide evidence that monitoring by 
financial experts deters managers from adjusting earnings upward to beat analyst forecast 
targets and leads to firms missing the target when management has negative private 
information regarding future financial performance. 
 Second, I contribute to the literature that examines the role of the board in 
determining earnings quality. Prior studies generally assume that accruals management 
reduces information value of earnings so that effective boards should prohibit the use of 
accruals management. Klein (2002) and Xie, et al. (2003) both find that, in general, a 
higher quality board (i.e., a more independent board or audit committee) is associated 
with a lower magnitude of discretionary accruals. I extend this stream of literature by 
arguing that accruals management is not necessarily harmful to shareholders. If board 
members have sufficient financial expertise, they should not unconditionally discourage 
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the use of accruals. Instead, they will discourage the recognition of accruals when it 
diminishes the information value of the earnings and allow managers to adjust accruals to 
improve the decision usefulness of earnings.  
 Third, I contribute to the literature regarding the impact of accruals to beat the 
targets on earnings quality. Prior studies document the tendency of firms to use accruals 
to beat the analyst forecast (Bergstresser, et al., 2006). However, it is not clear whether 
the use of accruals to beat the target increases or decreases the quality of earnings. 
Although most previous studies interpret earnings management to beat the targets as a 
means by which managers obtain private benefits (Bergstresser, et al., 2006; Cheng, et 
al., 2005; Matsunaga, et al., 2001; McVay, et al., 2006), my analyses suggest that when 
managers are closely monitored by financial experts, accruals might be used to signal 
future strong performance and result in higher earnings quality.  
 This study also has implications for standard setters. I find that financial experts 
are better able to preserve a high quality of financial reporting, supporting the SEC’s 
intention to push for additional financial experts on the audit committee. I also contribute 
to the controversy about the definition of financial expertise. The use of a financial expert 
remains a controversial issue. Some have argued that effective audit committee members 
are those who have general management experience (Olson, 1999), while others believe 
that accounting-specific expertise may be more important for audit committee members 
because audit committees are responsible for numerous duties that require a relatively 
high degree of accounting sophistication (DeFond, et al., 1997; Krishnan, et al., 2008). I 
find that the presence of both accounting and nonaccounting experts, who gain their 
expertise from supervising employees and overseeing the performance of companies, are 
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able to contribute to the effectiveness of the board. This suggests that the SEC’s wide-
ranging definition of financial expertise may not be a compromise to allay public 
criticism but rather reflects the need for broader expertise on the board.11 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
related literature and hypotheses development. Section III discusses my sample selection 
procedure and variable definitions, and provides summary statistics. In section IV, I 
outline the research design and present empirical results. Section V discusses the role of 
accounting-specific expertise. Section VI reports the results of additional tests, and 
Section VII shows the results from sensitivity tests. Section VIII presents conclusions. 
                                                          
11
 This broad definition of financial expertise was subsequently adopted by the NASDAQ (NASD 
Rule 4350(d)(2)(A)), while the NYSE implicitly adopted a broad definition by delegating the task 
of interpreting financial expertise to the board of their registrants (NYSE Section 303A(7)(a)). 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 Prior studies provide evidence that managers have strong incentives to avoid 
negative earnings surprises because negative earnings surprises generally lead to negative 
price revisions (Bartov et al., 2002; Graham et al., 2005). The benefits that managers 
enjoy from avoiding negative earnings surprises include maximizing the value of their 
stock-based compensation (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
McVay, et al., 2006), increasing their cash bonus (Matsunaga and Park, 2001), 
establishing implicit contracting reputation (Bowen et al., 1995), and avoiding litigation 
risk (Matsumoto, 2002).12 Consistent with managers’ incentives to beat the analyst 
forecast, prior studies have shown that managers adjust accruals to produce earnings that 
beat the target. Burgstahler and Eames (2006) find that managers manage earnings 
upward through accruals in order to avoid reporting negative earnings surprises. Ayers et 
al. (2006) document a significant positive association between discretionary accruals and 
beating the analyst forecast benchmark.  
 Adjusting accruals to avoid negative earnings surprises can either increase or 
decrease the information value of earnings, depending on the nature of management’s 
private information. If managers have negative private information regarding future 
earnings performance, adjusting accruals to beat the analyst forecast target provides a 
misleadingly optimistic picture of the financial success of the firm that allows managers 
an opportunity to increase their personal wealth. Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that 
                                                          
12
 Although managers also have incentive to lower report earnings in order to miss the target, the 
evidence is rare. The only explanation so far is that executives who consider their stock options 
are more likely to seek to miss targets. Missing earnings targets can reward a CEO with option 
grants that are pegged to a lower stock price (McAnally et al., 2008). 
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high equity incentives motivate managers to engage in earnings management to beat 
analyst forecasts in order to increase the value of the shares. Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) provide evidence that the use of accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more 
pronounced at firms where CEOs' potential total compensation is more closely tied to the 
value of their stock and option holdings. In addition, McVay, et al. (2006) find that the 
likelihood of just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecast is strongly associated 
with subsequent managerial stock sales. Bartov et al. (2004) find that earnings are 
abnormally high prior to option exercises.  
 On the other hand, if managers have favorable information regarding future 
earnings performance, adjusting accruals to beat the analyst forecast reveals managers' 
private positive information and provides a more timely measure of a firm's future 
performance. When managers adjust accruals around analyst forecasts in an efficient 
manner consistent with minimizing information asymmetry, the earnings number 
becomes more informative and shareholders are able to make better informed decisions. 
Subramanyam (1996) suggests that managerial discretion improves the ability of earnings 
to reflect economic value. Xue (2003) also finds that firms with high-growth 
opportunities are more likely to adjust accruals to signal future performance.  
 Assuming that the interests of shareholders and the board of directors are properly 
aligned, directors should respond to investors’ demands for higher quality financial 
information.13 As a result, when managers have unfavorable information regarding future 
performance, the board should deter managers from adjusting earnings upward to beat the 
                                                          
13
 Rather than being completely aligned with the interests of shareholders, boards’ interests can be 
aligned with managers’ interests (i.e., the board consists of individuals assumed to be beholden to 
the CEO). I address this concern by examining independent financial experts in my empirical 
tests. Independent directors who are concerned about their reputation are less likely to align with 
managers (Yermack 2004). 
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analyst forecast because such adjustment might be driven by managers' self-interest 
incentives and diminishes the information value of earnings. Conversely, when managers 
have positive information regarding future earnings, the board should allow managers' 
accruals adjustment to beat the target since such adjustment signals strong future 
performance and improves the decision usefulness of earnings.  
 However, this assumes that board members should have enough expertise to 
understand management’s private information regarding future earnings. Prior research 
suggests that lack of appropriate expertise may reduce directors’ ability to monitor the 
financial reporting process. For example, Krishnan et al. (2008) find that the proportion 
of nonaccounting financial experts on the audit committee (i.e., directors with experience 
as CEO or president) is unrelated with accounting conservatism, while the propotion of 
accounitng financial experts is significantly positively correlated with conservatism. In 
addition, Defond et al. (2005) document a positive market reaction to the appointment of 
an accounting expert, but no reaction to the appoinment of nonaccounitng financial 
expert.  
 Regulators also emphasize the importance of financial expertise on the audit 
committee (General Accounting Office, 1991; Public Oversight Board, 1993; Blue 
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 
1999; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [SOX], 2002). This implies that regulators have the 
concern that board members who lack sufficient financial expertise might deter an audit 
committee’s ability to ensure high-quality reported earnings. For example, Section 407 of 
SOX requires firms to disclose whether at least one of the audit committee members is a 
financial expert. The NYSE requires that at least one member of the audit committee 
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have accounting or related financial management expertise and that all members of the 
audit committee be financially literate. The NASDAQ rules require companies to certify 
whether at least one member of the audit committee has past employment experience in 
finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other 
comparable experience or background that results in the individual's financial 
sophistication, including being or having been a CEO, CFO, or other senior officer with 
financial oversight responsibilities. 
  In this paper, I focus on audit committee financial experts as defined by Section 
407 of the SOX Act. I argue that these directors are better able to monitor financial 
reporting and disclosure issues through their knowledge base, educational background, or 
prior working experience. Based on Section 407 of the SOX Act, an audit committee 
financial expert is a person who has an understanding of generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP); experience in preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial 
statements; and the ability to understand the accounting principle or to understand 
internal controls and procedures for financial reporting (SEC, 2003). Under the final rules 
adopted by the SEC, an audit committee member can be deemed a financial expert if the 
member has: (a) accounting expertise from work experience as a certified public 
accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, financial comptroller, financial controller, or 
accounting officer; (b) finance expertise from work experience as an investment banker, 
financial analyst, or any other financial management role; or (c) supervisory expertise 
from supervising the preparation of financial statements (e.g., CEO or company 
president). Audit committee financial experts are expected to understand and evaluate the 
accounting accruals, estimates, and reserves, and serve as a resource for the audit 
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committee in carrying out its function of protecting the integrity of the financial reporting 
system.  
 Empirical academic research generally supports the regulatory view that audit 
committee financial expertise is related to higher quality financial reporting. Agrawal et 
al. (2005) find that the odds of restating financial statements are significantly lower when 
the audit committee has an independent financial expert on the audit committee. Farber 
(2005) finds that firms subject to an SEC enforcement action have fewer financial experts 
on their audit committees than a control group of similar firms. Similarly, Krishnan 
(2005) documents that the financial expertise of audit committee members is negatively 
related to the incidence of internal control problems. Zhang et al. (2007) also provide 
evidence that firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness 
under SOX if their audit committees have less financial expertise. Overall, the empirical 
evidence supports the notion that members of the audit committee with financial 
expertise possess experience-based and well-developed frameworks and can better 
monitor firms’ financial reporting process.  
As a result, I argue that audit committee members with financial expertise are 
better able to evaluate managers’ private information regarding future performance and to 
assess the quality of the information signaled by beating or missing the analyst forecast 
target. Thus, managers in firms with more intensive monitoring by financial experts 
would only engage in accruals management when they have positive information about 
future performance, while mangers in firms with less intensive monitoring by financial 
experts would always manage accruals to beat the target. This leads to an overall negative 
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relationship between the unconditional likelihood that a firm will adjust accruals to beat 
the analyst forecast and the intensity of financial experts' monitoring. 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of an independent financial expert on the audit committee is 
negatively related to accruals adjustment to beat analyst forecasts. 
In addition, since financial experts are able to evaluate mangers' private 
information regarding future performance, I expect to observe a differential impact of 
financial experts on the odds of using accruals to beat the target, contingent upon future 
performance. When managers have negative information about future earnings, financial 
expert directors on the audit committee are expected to discourage managers from 
managing earnings upward to beat the analyst forecast because such adjustment 
diminishes the information usefulness of earnings. Yet, when the accruals adjustment 
reveals managers' private favorable information and reduces the information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders, financial expert directors are expected to allow 
managers to adjust accruals to beat the target. This discussion would lead to the following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2A: The presence of an independent financial expert on the audit committee 
is negatively related to the odds of beating analyst forecasts by adjusting accruals when 
the manager has unfavorable information regarding future financial performance. 
Hypothesis 2B: The impact of an independent financial expert on the odds of beating 
analyst forecasts by adjusting accruals is stronger when the manager has unfavorable 
information regarding future financial performance than when the manager has 
favorable information regarding future performance. 
  
18 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Sample Selection 
 The sample starts with all firms possessing available quarterly data from 
COMPUSTAT, covering the years from 2004 to 2011. I restrict my sample to post-2004 
data because the SOX provision regarding financial experts is effective in 2003. The 
sample is restricted to pre-2011 data because I need to examine earnings performance in 
subsequent quarters. An I/B/E/S summary file provides quarterly analyst forecast data. 
COMPUSTAT provides firm-specific financial information. Board data are obtained 
from the Corporate Library database for 2004-2008, and from RiskMetrics for 2009-2011 
because the financial expert data is missing in Corporate Library after 2008. The 
Corporate Library is an independent investment research firm specializing in corporate 
governance and board effectiveness, and its database includes coverage of more than 
3,700 U.S. corporations and more than 38,000 individual directorships for the 2000-2008 
proxy reporting year. The database contains data collected from proxy statement filings, 
including information on each director’s work experience, director independence, and 
committee assignments. The director data in RiskMetrics includes a range of variables 
related to individual board directors (e.g., name, age, tenure, gender, committee 
memberships, independence classification, primary employer and title, number of other 
public company boards serving on, shares owned, etc.). RiskMetrics data collection 
began in 1996 and is updated annually.  
 I drop observations that have missing total assets or SIC code in COMPUSTAT. I 
also delete all firms with Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes from 4400-5000 
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(utility industry), 6000-6999 (financial services), and 9000-9999 (nonclassifiable 
establishments), because accrual estimation is problematic for these industry sectors. In 
addition, I require all observations to have sufficient board and audit committee data from 
Corporate Library or RiskMetrics and sufficient forecast data from I/B/E/S. I also require 
each firm to have quarterly earnings data for all four quarters for the given year. Finally, 
to reduce the effects of extreme observations, I truncate firm-quarter observations in the 
top and bottom one percent of distributions of all continuous variables. Table 1 Panel A 
presents the sample selection (See Appendix B for all tables). 
Accruals Measures 
 Consistent with prior literature, discretionary accruals estimated from the cross-
sectional adaptation of the modified Jones model (Dechow, et al., 1995; Balsam et al., 
2002) are used as the primary measure of earnings management. The estimation 
procedure is as follows. First, total accruals are calculated directly from the statement of 
cash flows: 
ACCRitq = IBCYitq – CFOitq 
IBCY is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations for firm i year t 
quarter q, scaled by lagged total assets for firm i year t quarter q. CFO is cash flow from 
continuing operations for firm i year t quarter q, which is measured as extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations plus operating activities for firm i year t quarter q, 
scaled by lagged total assets for firm i year t quarter q. See Appendix A for variable 
measures.  
 The expected accruals under the modified Jones model are measured by: 
E 	,, = α + β 

	,, + β 
∆∆
	,,  + β 

	,,                    (1) 
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ACCR is total accruals (defined above). TA
 
is total assets for firm i year t quarter q. REV
 
is change in net revenues for firm i year t quarter q. REC
 
is change in accounts receivable 
for firm i year t quarter q. GPPE
 
is gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i year t 
quarter q. See appendix A for variable measures.  
 Ordinary least squares is used to obtain industry-specific estimates of the 
coefficients. The column parameters α, β0, β1 and β2 are estimated using a 
contemporaneous estimation sample of all two-digit SIC code peers in the same year and 
same quarter. I exclude all industry-year-quarters that have fewer than twenty 
observations. Discretionary accruals (as percentage of lagged total assets) for firm i 
quarter t are represented by: 
DAC !" = 	,, − α$ + β%

	,, + β%
∆"∆
	,,  + β%
&
	,,           (2) 
α$  β', β' and β' and are the estimates of	α, β0, β1 and β2 from the quarterly cross-sectional 
two- digit SIC industry regression (1).  
 For each firm-quarter observation, I first calculate nondiscretionary EPS 
(NDEPS), which I define as: 
NDEPSitq = Actual EPSitq - DACitq per share 
 I then compute an adjusted forecast error (AdjFEitq), where: 
AdjFEitq = NDEPSitq - Median Value of Consensus Analyst Forecasts for firm i year t 
quarter q. Essentially, AdjFE represents the difference between analyst estimated 
earnings and the earnings number that managers would report if no discretionary accruals 
were recorded.14 Stated differently, AdjFE represents the deficiency in earnings that 
managers would have to eliminate through discretionary accruals in order to exceed the 
                                                          
14
 I use the last I/B/E/S consensus forecast before the earnings announcement (Burgstahler and 
Eames 2006) as analyst earnings targets. 
  
21 
 
 
consensus earnings forecasts. Accordingly, I construct a sample of 1,460 firm-quarter 
observations that have earnings before discretionary accruals initially below the analyst 
forecast target by less than one cent (-0.01<AdjFE<0). I assume that firms that just miss 
the analyst forecast by less than one cent should be capable of adjusting accruals to beat 
the target. Among 1,460 observations, I further identify 1,091 firm-quarter observations 
that have earnings before discretionary accruals initially just below the forecast (-
0.01<AdjFE<0), but report sufficient positive discretionary accruals that allow earnings 
to meet or exceed analyst forecasts (FE = [actual earnings per share - median consensus 
analysts' forecast] ≧0) as the earnings management sample. The rest of the 369 firm-
quarter observations have earnings before discretionary accruals initially just below the 
forecast (-0.01<AdjFE<0), and still report earnings that miss analyst forecasts (FE<0). I 
consider these observations as firms that chose not to adjust accruals to beat the target.  
Variables Measures 
 My hypotheses predict that when managers have private information about 
disappointing future earnings, audit committee financial experts will restrict managers 
from using accruals to beat the analyst forecast. Assuming managers’ private information 
about firms' future earnings performance is unbiased, the realized earnings in the future 
quarter should reflect managers’ private information in the current quarter. Empirically, I 
use next quarter’s earnings surprises to capture firms’ future performance. If a firm 
projects next quarter's earnings at less than the analyst forecast, I code the dummy 
variable (BadNEWS) to equal 1, and zero otherwise. In order to make sure that the 
analyst forecast in quarter t+1 is not affected by the earnings surprise in quarter t, I use 
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the latest consensus forecasts before quarter t’s earnings release to calculate the earnings 
surprises. 
 Section 407 of the SOX Act mandates firms to disclose whether there is at least 
one financial expert on the audit committee. Using data from Corporate Library and 
RiskMetrics, I create a dummy variable (FEDIR1) that equals 1 when there is at least one 
independent financial expert on the audit committee, and zero otherwise. I focus on the 
independence of financial experts for several reasons. 15 First, prior studies generally 
suggest that the interests of independent directors are more likely to be aligned with 
shareholders due to concerns about their reputation (Byrd and Yermack, 2004). In 
addition, Section 301 of the SOX Act mandates the SEC to direct the national securities 
exchange and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any company that 
does not require all of its audit committee members to be independent. Following the 
requirement, publicly traded firms should have only audit committee members who are 
independent from management.16 Even though not all reporting companies are listed on a 
national securities exchange or association, Section 407 of the SOX Act explicitly 
requires a company to disclose whether the financial expert is independent of 
management, because the SEC believes that “investors in these companies would be 
interested in knowing whether the audit committee financial expert is independent of 
                                                          
15 The definition of “independen”t in Section 407 follows the listing standards of the NYSE, the 
AMEX, and Nasdaq. Different securities laws include different definitions of "grey” (affiliated) 
directors. In this paper I use a strict definition which excludes the grey directors as independent 
directors. 
 
16
 In my sample, the correlation between the number of independent financial experts and the 
number of total financial experts is 96.9%, suggesting that most financial experts on the audit 
committee are independent from management. 
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management.” This suggests that the SEC is concerned about the independence of audit 
committee financial experts.  
Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that, relative to all 
Compustat firms, my sample includes firms that are larger in size (log market value) and 
total assets, and are more profitable. In addition, my sampled firms recognize less 
discretionary accruals on average than all Compustat firms. However, the median value 
of discretionary accruals per share (DAC) of my sampled firms is 0.0003, which is 
similar to the median value of the Compustat sample. This similarity suggests that the 
larger mean value of DAC in the Compustat sample might be driven by outliers.  
 Panel B of Table 2 shows the summary statistics for firms that have earnings 
before discretionary accruals below analyst forecast by less than one cent. As expected, 
the mean value of DAC of firms that beat the forecast is significantly positive and larger 
than the value of firms that miss the forecast. This finding is consistent with managers 
who use accruals to avoid missing the analyst forecast. On average, firms that beat the 
forecasts through accruals have significantly less negative adjusted forecast error (AdjFE) 
than firms that miss the forecast, implying that it might be easier for those managers to 
adjust accruals to beat the target. The actual forecast error (FE) of firms that beat the 
target is 0.003, which is significantly larger than that of firms that miss the target.  
 The median firm has 10 directors on the board, with about 7 independent directors 
and 3 inside directors. These percentages are similar to those reported in the prior studies. 
Yermack (1996) reports a median of 12 board members with about 8 outsiders. Faleye et 
al. (2011) report that the median board has 9 members, 6 of whom are independent 
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directors, using data for the period 1998 to 2006. There is no significant difference in 
board composition between firms that beat the target and firms that miss the target. In 
addition, firms that adjust accruals to beat the targets are larger in size (measured by log 
of market value).  
 Panel C of Table 2 presents the distribution of independent financial experts in 
my sample. Of firms that beat the target by adjusting accruals, 10.26% do not have any 
independent financial expert on the audit committee. Of firms that miss the target, 6.82% 
do not have any independent financial expert on the audit committee. In addition, half of 
the firms that beat the target have one audit committee financial expert, while 55% of 
firms that miss the target have one audit committee financial expert.  
 Panel D of Table 2 shows the distribution of independent accounting experts on 
the audit committee. On average, 85% of firms do not have any independent accounting 
expert on the audit committee. Only 15% of firms have at least one audit committee 
accounting expert. This statistic is similar to prior studies. For example, Krishnan et al. 
(2008) show that about 20% of firms have at least one accounting financial expert for the 
period 2000 to 2002. Defond et al. (2005) find that 17% of firms assign one accounting 
financial expert for the period of 1993 to 2002. This suggests that the presence of at least 
one accounting financial expert is relatively rare.  
 Table 3 provides a correlation table of board characteristics. As expected, large 
firms generally have larger boards, and the correlation between board size and firm size 
is significantly positive. The correlation between the number of independent financial 
experts and the number of total financial experts is 97.2%, suggesting that most of the 
financial experts on the audit committee are independent from management. In addition, 
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the correlation between the number of independent accounting financial experts and the 
number of independent financial experts is 0.113, which suggesting that the presence of 
accounting financial experts is rare in my sample.     
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Test of H1 
 Hypothesis H1 predicts that the monitoring imposed by financial experts reduces 
the unconditional tendency to use accruals to beat the analyst forecast. To test this 
prediction, I estimate the following logit model and predict a negative relation between 
the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee and the possibility of 
unconditional accruals management to beat analyst forecast targets.  
Prob(JUSTBEATi,t,qϵ(0,1))=logit(α0 +βFEDIR1i,t,q+α1SIZEi,t,q+α2BTMi,t,q+α3SHARESi,t,q                   
 +α4NUM_ESTIMATEi,t,q+α5CV_AFi,t,q 
+α6DOWN_REVi,t,q+α7BOARD_SIZEi,t,q 
+α8BOARD_INDi,t,q+α9AC_SIZEi,t,q+ζi,t,q)            (3)   
  
The sample is restricted to firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals come in 
below the target. JUSTBEAT equals 1 for firms that beat the target by reporting 
sufficient positive discretionary accruals, and zero for firms that miss the target. See 
Appendix A for variable measures. 
 Following prior research, I include various control variables that might correlate 
with earnings surprises. I control for market value (SIZE) and book-to-market ratio 
(BTM). Skinner et al. (2002) find that high-growth firms might be more likely to beat 
analyst forecasts to avoid the torpedo effect associated with missing analyst forecast 
targets. The number of outstanding shares (SHARES) is included because firms with 
more outstanding shares have smaller EPS and are thus more likely to beat analyst 
forecasts of EPS (Bartov, et al., 2002).  
 In addition, I include three variables to control for analyst forecast attributes: 
number of analysts (NUM_ESTIMATE), dispersion of individual forecast (CV_AF), and 
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a downward revision dummy (DOWN_REV). The incentives to beat analyst forecasts 
can be stronger if more analysts are following the firm or if greater consensus exists 
among analysts (Payne et al., 2000). As shown in Matsumoto (2002), it is easier to beat 
analyst forecasts that have been guided downward, so I include a dummy variable to 
indicate whether analyst forecasts are revised downward in the three months before 
earnings announcements. 
  Lastly, I control for board characteristics other than audit committee financial 
expertise. I include BOARD_SIZE to capture the number of directors on the board. I also 
include number of independent directors (BOARD_IND) to control for the effect of 
board independence. Prior studies generally suggest that board independence is related to 
the board’s monitoring ability (Weisbach, 1988; Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996). In 
addition, the Blue Ribbon Committee suggests that audit committees should have at least 
three members, implying that larger audit committees are more likely to have a wider 
knowledge base on which to draw and are better able to perform their oversight duty. 
Thus, number of audit committee members (AC_SIZE) is included to control for the size 
of the audit committee.  
 Table 4 reports the results in each logit regression. As expected, a significantly 
negative relation exists between the measure of audit committee financial expertise and 
the odds of unconditional accruals adjustments to beat the analyst forecast target. The 
coefficient on FEDIR1 is -0.687 (with p value <0.01), suggesting that the possibility of 
beating the analyst forecast decreases when the firm has at least one independent 
financial expert director on the audit committee. Table 4 also shows that firms are more 
likely to beat the target by adjusting accruals when they have more analysts following the 
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target. In addition, board size is negatively associated with the possibility of using 
accruals to beat the target.  
Test of H2 
 In this section, I empirically test Hypothesis 2 by partitioning my sample based on 
firms’ future financial performance and estimating the following equation: 
  Prob (JUSTBEATi,t,qϵ(0,1))=logit(α0 +β0FEDIR1i,t,q+β1BadNEWSi,t,q*FEDIRi,t,q 
+β2BadNEWSi,t,q+αnCONTROLi,t,q+ζi,t,q)                      (4) 
  
JUSTBEAT is defined as in previous section. BadNEWS equals 1 if the firm has negative 
earnings surprises in quarter t+1, and zero otherwise. CONTROL is the same as in 
section 4.1. See Appendix A for variable measures.  
 In equation (4), β0 captures the effect of the presence of at least one independent 
financial expert on the odds of beating the analyst forecast target. By interacting the 
BadNEWS dummy with FEDIR1, β1 captures the incremental effect of the presence of at 
least one independent financial expert on the odds of beating the analyst forecasts by 
adjusting accruals for the firm that has a negative earnings surprise in the following 
quarter; and β0+ β1 is the total effect of the presence of at least one independent financial 
expert on the odds of beating target for the firm whose earnings fall below analyst 
forecasts in quarter t+1. Hypothesis 2A predicts that β0+β1 is negative. Hypothesis 2B 
predicts that β1 is negative because the impact of the presence of at least one financial 
expert on the odds of beating the targets by adjusting accruals is greater when future 
performance is poor than when future performance is strong.  
 Table 5 shows the results using next quarter's earnings surprises to proxy for 
managers' private information regarding future performance. Consistent with Hypothesis 
2A, which predicts that financial experts' monitoring discourages managers from 
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adjusting accruals to beat analyst forecasts when the firm has poor future performance, 
the sum of β0+β1 is significantly negative (see last row of Table 6). This outcome suggests 
that independent financial experts discourage managers from adjusting accruals to beat 
analyst forecasts when firms have a negative earnings surprise in quarter t+1. In addition, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2B, the coefficient on FEDIR1*BadNEWS is significantly 
negative (β1= -0.808; p<0.01), suggesting that there is an incremental negative effect of 
the presence of at least one financial expert on the odds of beating targets for firms with a 
negative earnings surprise in the next quarter. Results for the control variables are 
consistent with those reported in Table 4. Firms with more analysts are more likely to 
beat the target.  
 To summarize, I find results consistent with my hypotheses. Independent financial 
experts protect shareholders by monitoring managers’ financial reporting process. Due to 
their education background or related working experience, audit committee financial 
experts are able to evaluate managers’ private information regarding future performance. 
When managers have negative information regarding future performance, managers in 
firms with more intensive financial expert monitoring are less likely to manipulate 
earnings upward to achieve analyst forecast targets, compared to those with less intensive 
financial expert monitoring.  
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CHAPTER V 
ACCOUNTING EXPERTISE ON THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
 In this section, I focus on accounting expertise on the audit committee. One of the 
most controversial SOX provisions is the definition of financial expertise on the audit 
committee. The SEC’s original proposal adopts a definition of financial expertise that 
focuses on whether the director has prior accounting experience with financial reporting 
and suggests that such directors will have work experience as a public accountant, 
auditor, principal financial or accounting officer, or controller. Accounting-specific 
expertise is viewed as important for audit committee members because audit committees 
are responsible for numerous duties that require a relatively high degree of accounting 
sophistication. For example, audit committees are expected to assess the extent to which 
the firm’s accounting policies are aggressive or conservative, and understand how these 
policies affect the firm’s financial posture. Further, they evaluate judgmental accounting 
areas such as the company’s reserves, review management’s handling of proposed audit 
adjustments by the external auditors, and appraise the quality, and not just the 
acceptability, of the firm’s financial reports (Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Cmmittees, 1999; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999). 
 However, narrowly defining financial expertise as accounting-related expertise 
has been widely criticized. Critics of the definition argue that its narrow focus on 
accounting-related expertise is unnecessarily restrictive and limits the pool of qualified 
directors. For example, the American Association of Bank Directors claims that the 
definition even disqualifies Alan Greenspan as a financial expert, and a Wall Street 
Journal article questions whether Warren Buffet would meet the requirements demanded 
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by the rule (American Association of Bank Directors, 2002). Due to the widespread 
criticism of the narrow definition, the SEC “compromised” by broadening the definition 
of financial expertise in its final version of the SOX provision (Defond, et al., 2005). The 
final rule gives board members wide latitude to qualify a director as a financial expert by 
suggesting that directors may gain such expertise through experience supervising 
employees with financial reporting responsibilities, overseeing the performance of 
companies, and other relevant experience. Although the SEC does not explicitly state the 
job title “qualified financial expert” under this broader definition, the final rule logically 
extends the field of qualified experts to encompass company presidents and CEOs.  
 Because of the controversy surrounding the SEC’s definition of financial 
expertise, the definition of what constitutes a financial expert has given rise to academic 
research on the effects of accounting and nonaccounting financial expertise on financial 
reporting quality. The result of whether nonaccounting expertise is beneficial to the 
effectiveness of audit committees is mixed. Krishnan et al. (2008) find that in general, 
accounting conservatism is not correlated with nonaccounting financial expertise or 
nonfinancial expertise. Zhang et al. (2007) find that both accounting and nonaccounting 
financial experts affect the possibility of internal control weakness. They find that firms 
are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness if their audit 
committees have less accounting financial expertise and nonaccounting financial 
expertise. Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) find that the mix of accounting and 
nonaccounting expertise provides the most positive impact on accruals quality. 
 Thus, I examine whether the presence of accounting expertise affects the 
possibility of accruals management to beat the target. Following Defond et al. (2005), I 
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classify a financial expert as an accounting expert if the director has experience as a 
public accountant, auditor, principal or chief financial officer, controller, or principal or 
chief accounting officer. Other nonaccounting financial experts, such as company 
presidents, investment bankers, or CEOs, are excluded from accounting expertise. 
Because RiskMetrics does not provide information regarding financial experts’ profile, 
the sample period for this test is restricted from 2004 to 2008, the period covered by 
Corporate Library. This subsample consists of 1,106 firm-quarter observations.  
 To examine whether the presence of both independent accounting and 
nonaccounting financial experts is related to possible use of accruals to beat the analyst 
target, I estimate the following equation: 
Prob (JUSTBEATi,t,qϵ(0,1))=logit(α0 +β0ACCDIR1i,t,q+β1BadNEWSi,t,q*ACCDIR1i,t,q 
+β1NonACC_FEDIR1i,t,q 
+β1BadNEWSi,t,q*NonACC_FEDIR1i,t,q 
+β2BadNEWSi,t,q+αnCONTROLi,t,q+ζi,t,q)               (5) 
 
JUSTBEAT and BadNEWS are defined as in chapter IV. ACCDIR1 is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if there is at least one independent accounting expert on the audit committee 
and zero otherwise. NonACC_FEDIR1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least 
one independent nonaccounting financial expert on the audit committee (i.e., CEO, 
president, investment banker, etc.). CONTROL is the same as in chapter IV. See Appendix 
A for variable measures.  
 Table 6 shows the estimation of equation (5). I find that the presence of at least 
one independent accounting expert has a negative incremental effect on the possibility 
that the firm adjusts accruals to beat the target in firms with negative earnings surprises in 
quarter t+1. The coefficient on ACCDIR1 is significantly negative (β1=-0.687; p<0.05). I 
also find that the presence of at least one nonaccounting financial expert negatively 
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affects the possibility of adjusting accruals to beat the target. The coefficient on 
NonACC_FEDIR1 is -0.533 (p<0.05), suggesting that the combination of both 
accounting and nonaccounting expertise seems able to more effectively monitor mangers' 
financial accruals adjustment.17  
 These findings are consistent with prior studies which document that both 
accounting and nonaccounting expertise benefit the financial reporting process (Zhange 
et al., 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2005). Since nonaccounting experts typically consist of 
CEOs, presidents, investment bankers, or financial analysts, they have considerable 
experience in carrying out due diligence with regard to forecasting future performance, 
developing business strategy, and coping with major corporate events such as mergers 
and acquisitions. In the specific setting where accruals are used to beat analyst forecasts, 
my findings suggest that while nonaccounting experts do not possess the domain specific 
skills of accounting knowledge, the business and industry knowledge of these experts, 
when coupled with accounting expertise, provides incremental benefits.  
                                                          
17 I also find that the possibility of adjusting accruals to beat the target is significantly lower for 
firms with both accounting and nonaccounting financial experts. The coefficient on 
β0+β1+β2+β3 is -1.314 (p<0.01) suggests that the combination of both accounting and 
nonaccounting expertise seems able to more effectively monitor mangers' financial accruals 
adjustment. 
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CHAPTER VI  
ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Predictive Ability of Accruals 
 My prior findings suggest that the presence of at least one independent financial 
expert on the audit committee is related to higher quality of accruals when accruals are 
used to boost the income in order to beat the analyst forecast target. In order to provide 
further insight into the role of audit committee financial expertise in setting accrual 
estimates, I examine whether the presence of at least audit committee financial experts is 
associated with the predictive ability of accruals. Focusing on whether firms use accruals 
to beat the analyst forecast restricts my analyses to a small group of firms that have 
earnings before accruals that just miss the analyst forecast. In order to make my results 
more generalizable, I directly examine the predictive ability of accruals. I argue that firms 
with more intensive financial expert monitoring are more likely to use accruals to signal 
future performance. As a result, the accrual component should better predict future 
earnings when firms have more financial expert directors monitoring. 
 Following Sloan (1996), I estimate equation (6):  
EARNi,t,q+1=α +β1CFOi,t,q+β2ACCRi,t,q+β3CFOi,t,q*FEDIR1i,t,q+β4ACCRi,t,q*FEDIR1i,t,q+ζi,t,q(6)                              
 
EARN is net income before extraordinary items, deflated by lagged total assets. CFO and 
ACCR are defined in chapter III. See Appendix A for variable measures.  
 In equation (6), β3 is the incremental effect of the presence of at least one 
independent financial expert on the productive ability of the current cash flows 
component on future earnings. Similarly, a positive β4 captures the incremental effect of 
the presence of at least one independent financial expert on the productive ability of the 
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current accruals component on future earnings. β4 is predicted to be significantly positive 
because financial expert directors’ monitoring should improve the decision usefulness of 
the accruals component of earnings.  
 The results of estimating equation (6) are shown in Table 7. Consistent with prior 
studies, that both cash flows and accruals are able to predict future earnings, the 
coefficients on β1 and β2 are significantly positive. As expected, I find a significantly 
positive β4, suggesting that the relation between the current period’s accruals component 
and the following period’s earnings is stronger when the firm has at least one independent 
financial expert on the audit committee than when the firm has no audit committee 
financial expert. The coefficient on FEDIR1 is 0.159 (with p<0.05), suggesting that the 
presence of at least one independent audit committee financial expert represents 15.9% of 
predictive ability of accruals on future earnings. The findings are consistent with my 
hypotheses that audit committee financial expertise increases the decision usefulness of 
earnings. I find that the presence of at least one independent audit committee financial 
expert improves the decision usefulness of accruals components in predicting future 
earnings. 
Magnitude of Discretionary Accruals 
 My focus in this study is the impact of financial experts on the odds of accruals 
management in a specific setting where managers recognize positive accruals to beat the 
analyst forecast target. However, prior studies generally examine the relation between 
board characteristics and the magnitude of accruals and find that, on average, stronger 
boards are related to less accrual. For example, Klein (2002) documents that the absolute 
value of abnormal accruals is negatively related to the proportion of outside directors on 
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the overall board. In a similar vein to Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003) document that audit 
committee independence is associated with lower discretionary accruals. The underlying 
assumption of these studies is that discretionary (or abnormal) accruals reduce earnings 
quality; thus, independent directors or audit committee members should prohibit 
managers from recognizing discretionary accruals to protect shareholders.  
  In this section, I first attempt to reconcile my findings with prior studies by 
replicating the results from prior studies. I examine the relation between board or audit 
committee independence and the magnitude of accruals. I control for other factors that 
may be related to the absolute value of accruals or board or audit committee 
independence (Klein, 2002; Houmes et al., 2010), including log value of total assets 
(LOG_ATQ), firm size (SIZE), operating cash flows (CFO), earnings decrease 
(DECROA), firms with negative income for quarter t (LOSS), financial leverage 
(DEBT_ASSET), prior quarter abnormal value of net operating assets (ABNOA) and 
shares outstanding (SHARES), and size of the boards (BOARD_SIZE). I estimate the 
following equation: 
DACi,t,q=α +β1BOARD_VARi,t,q+α1LOG_ATQi,t,q+α2SIZEi,t,q+α3CFOi,t,q +α4DECROAi,t,q 
+α5LOSSi,t,q+α6ABNOAi,t,q-1+α7SHARESi,t,q+α8BOARD_SIZEi,t,q+ζi,t,q               (7)                                                                    
  
DAC is discretionary accruals estimated following the Modified Jones model. 
BOARD_VAR measures include BOARD_INC, AC_IND and FEDIR1. See Appendix A 
for variable measures.  
 Table 8 shows the results. Consistent with the findings from prior studies, 
discretionary accruals are negatively related at the 0.10 level to the number of 
independent directors on the board. The coefficient on BOARD_IND is significantly 
negative in column (1). Column (2) presents similar results when using the number of 
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independent audit committee members on the board to proxy for board quality. Although 
I find results that are consistent with prior studies, I do not suggest that the negative 
relation between board characteristics and the level of accruals is because accruals are 
always bad for shareholders and should be discouraged by strong boards. Instead, I argue 
that because independent directors or audit committee members do not have enough 
expertise to evaluate the quality of accruals, they unconditionally prohibit the recognition 
of accruals.  
 Financial experts who have sufficient knowledge to evaluate managers’ private 
information will oversee the accruals contingent upon managers' incentives. For example, 
when managers have negative information regarding future earnings, financial expert 
directors will discourage management to recognize “positive” accruals; while financial 
expert directors might discourage the recognition of “negative” accruals if it is harmful to 
shareholders. McAnally et al. (2008) find that firms are more likely to miss the target just 
before large CEO option grants, suggesting that managers lower income intentionally 
because of their option incentives. As a result, I do not predict that financial experts 
negatively affect the magnitude of overall accruals.  
 In Table 8, column (3) shows no meaningful relation between discretionary 
accruals and the presence of at least one independent financial expert director on the audit 
committee. Such insignificant results are consistent with my argument. Because financial 
expert directors have sufficient knowledge, in some cases they might prohibit the use of 
positive accruals to increase earnings while in other cases they might discourage the 
recognition of negative accruals to decrease earnings. As a result, no overall relation 
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exists between the audit committee financial expertise and the magnitude of overall 
discretionary accruals.  
More than One Independent Financial Expert 
 In this section, I examine whether there is any additional effect of having more 
than one independent financial expert on the audit committee. This test is motivated by 
the proposed rule of Section 407 of the SOX Act, which requires firms to disclose the 
number of financial experts on their audit committee. Although such requirement is not 
adopted by the final rule, the push for additional financial experts on the audit committee 
might suggest that financial expert directors are more capable of overseeing the financial 
reporting process and are better able to assess the information value of accruals.  
 I first examine whether the presence of exactly one independent financial expert 
affects the possibility of using accruals to beat the target when future performance is poor. 
I drop all observations that have more than one independent financial expert on the audit 
committee and create a dummy variable, FEONLY1, which equals 1 if there is only one 
independent financial expert on audit committee. I then reestimate equation (4) by 
replacing FEDIR1 to FEONLY1. Table 9 shows the results. Column (1) shows that the β1 
is
 
significantly negative, suggesting that the presence of exactly one financial expert 
discourages the use of accruals to beat the target for firms with negative earnings 
surprises in quarter t+1. 
 I then examine whether there is any additional effect of more than one 
independent financial expert on the audit committee by estimating the following 
regression.  
Prob (JUSTBEATi,t,qϵ(0,1))=logit(α0 +β0FEONLY1i,t,q+β1BadNEWSi,t,q*FEONLY1i,t,q 
+β2FEMORE1i,t,q+β3BadNEWSi,t,q*FEMORE1i,t,q  
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+β4BadNEWSi,t,q+αnCONTROLi,t,q+ζi,t,q)                   (8)                                                                 
 
JUSTBEAT and BadNEWS are defined as in chapter IV. Dummy variable FEONLY1 
equals 1 when there is one independent accounting expert on the audit committee, and 
zero otherwise. Dummy variable FEMORE1 equals 1 when there is more than one 
independent nonaccounting financial expert on the audit committee, and zero otherwise. 
CONTROL is the same as in chapter IV. See Appendix A for variable measures.  
 Column (2) of Table 9 shows the results. Consistent with the findings in column 
(1), the coefficient on BadNEWS*FEONLY1
 
is still
 
significantly negative. In addition, a 
significantly negative coefficient on BadNEWS*FEMORE1 suggests a negative 
incremental effect of the presence of more than one audit committee financial expert on 
the use of accruals to beat the target when future performance is poor. I also find a total 
negative effect of having more than one financial expert on the odds of using accruals to 
beat the target when future performance is poor (the sum of β2+β3 is significantly 
negative).  
 Although I find that the presence of more than one independent audit committee 
financial expert affects the possibility of using accruals to beat the target, my results 
show that the presence of exactly one independent financial expert can also discourage 
managers from recognizing accruals to beat the target when future performance is poor. 
Thus, the benefit that firms enjoy from the presence of more than one financial expert is 
not clear.  
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CHAPTER VII 
SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
Matched Sample 
  My main results are based on the observation having earnings before 
discretionary accruals below analyst forecasts by less than one cent. The implied 
assumption is that firms missing forecasts by less than one cent are capable of adjusting 
accruals to beat the target but choose not to do so. One concern with this result is that 
firms missing analyst forecasts by less than one cent might be incapable of adjusting 
accruals to beat analyst forecasts. Therefore, the negative relation between financial 
experts’ monitoring and the odds of accruals management that destroys the decision 
usefulness of earnings could instead reflect the firms’ capacity to use accruals adjustment 
to beat the target. In other words, firms with one financial expert on the audit committee 
might have less flexibility in accruals.  
  In order to mitigate this concern, I construct a matched sample. I first select all 
firm-quarter observations that beat the analyst forecast target by adjusting accruals 
(AdjFE<0 & FE≥0). Among all my sampled firms, 1,405 observations ave earnings 
before discretionary accruals below analyst forecast (AdjFE<0) but report earnings that 
are above analyst forecasts (FE≥0 ). Of 1,405 observations that use accruals to beat the 
target, 880 observations are able to be matched by observations that miss the target 
(AdjFE<0 & FE<0) based on year, prior-quarter NOA, and industry (two digit SIC 
code).18 Theoretically, these matched firms are more likely to have the ability to adjust 
accruals to beat the target because they have a level of net operating assets similar to 
                                                          
18
 The difference in NOA between matched observation and sampled observations is restricted 
between ±0.01.  
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firms that beat the target through accruals. Using the NOA-matched sample provides a 
more powerful setting to examine whether managers choose to miss the analyst forecast 
target when they perceive more intensive financial experts’ monitoring on the audit 
committee. 
 Table 10 shows the results by using an NOA-matched sample. All of the results 
are consistent with the main results. I still find that the presence of at least one 
independent financial expert is associated with lower odds of using accruals to beat the 
target for firms with negative earnings surprises. The findings from using the NOA-
matched sample reinforce my hypotheses that financial experts on the audit committee 
discourage managers from using accruals to beat the analyst forecast target when the 
adjustment destroys the quality of earnings. Managers in firms with more independent 
financial expert directors are more likely to choose to miss the target when they have 
negative information regarding the firms’ future performance.  
Controlling for Endogeneity 
 One concern regarding the prior results is the possibility of a reverse causal 
relation. This would occur if financial experts with knowledge about the firm’s 
accounting systems systematically opt out of serving on boards of firms with low 
financial reporting quality. This suggests that the quality of earnings and the intensity of 
financial experts are endogenously determined, which would bias the regression analysis. 
I address this endogeneity problem using several approaches. First, I estimate 
simultaneous equations in the odds of beating targets by adjusting accruals and number of 
financial experts using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. My first-stage model 
captures the determinants of board structure including monitoring and advising costs, 
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information asymmetry, and business complexity (Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008). 
More specifically, it includes free cash flow, research and development expenditures, 
capital expenditure, number of segments (firm complexity and advising benefits), CEO 
tenure, and leverage.  
  Table 11 reports the parameter estimates. Panel A presents the results on the 
determinants of the number of financial expert directors. I include all the endogenous 
variables as well as exogenous variables in the regression. I find that FEDIR1 is 
positively related to BOARD_IND (p-value< 0.01). Consistent with Coles et al. (2008) 
that more complex firms may have higher advising needs, I find that the presence of at 
least one financial experts is positively related to capital expenditure. In addition, CEO 
tenure is positively associated with the presence of at least one independent financial 
expert.  
 In the second stage, I replace FEDIR1 with the predicted value from the first-
stage model. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 11. I continue to find a negative 
total effect of (predicted) FEDIR1 and the odds of beating target by accruals when the 
firms have negative earnings surprise in quarter t+1 (see last row of Panel B Table 11). In 
addition, the significant negative coefficient on β1 suggests a significant incremental 
effect of financial experts on the odds of beating target for firms with negative earnings 
surprises. 
 While my results are qualitatively similar under 2SLS, this method could be 
subject to specification error. Thus, following Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), I use 
lagged (instead of contemporaneous) values of number of financial experts in regressions 
of the odds of beating analyst forecast targets, and all the results are unchanged.  
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Other Future Performance Measures 
 In the main section, I use next quarter’s analyst forecast as a benchmark to 
measure future financial performance. In this section, I attempt to use other 
measurements to capture managers' private information regarding future performance. I 
first create a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm's earnings in quarter t+1 is less than 
the earnings in the same quarter of the prior year. If the firms have negative change in 
earnings in quarter t+1, I expect that the presence of at least a financial expert should be 
associated with lower likelihood of using accruals to beat the targets. I find results that 
are consistent with my prediction. 
 In addition, I use longer-term future performance to proxy for mangers’ private 
information regarding future earnings. I classify a firm as poor performing if it has a 
negative earnings surprise in quarter t+1 and t+2. All the results remain the same. I also 
examine earnings surprises in the subsequently three quarters and still find similar results. 
These evidences may suggest that the board is concerned about relatively long-term 
future performance. 
Other Financial Experts Measures 
 Besides using the presence of at least one independent financial expert on the 
audit committee (FEDIR1), I also use continuous variables to capture financial experts' 
monitoring, namely, the number of financial experts on audit committees and the 
percentage of financial experts on the audit committees. The main findings remain 
unchanged. I still document a negative relation between the number and the percentage of 
financial experts on the audit committee and the possibility of using accruals to beat the 
targets for a firm with next quarter's earnings below analyst forecast. I also use an 
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industry median as a benchmark to capture the financial experts' monitoring by 
constructing a dummy variable which equals 1 if the number of financial expert directors 
on the audit committee is below industry median, and zero otherwise. The results remain 
similar. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 Considerable evidence suggests that managers adjust accruals to beat the analyst 
forecast. However, the implications of accruals adjustment on earnings quality are not 
clear. On the one hand, when managers have negative information regarding future 
earnings performance, accruals adjustment could mislead shareholders and result in lower 
quality of financial reporting. On the other hand, accruals could signal strong future 
earnings growth and thereby improve the decision usefulness of earnings. If boards 
protect shareholders by ensuring higher quality financial information, they should only 
discourage managers from adjusting earnings to beat the target if doing so reduces the 
quality of financial information.  
 In this study, I specifically examine whether the monitoring imposed by financial 
experts on the audit committee affect managers' accruals adjustment to beat analyst 
forecasts conditional upon future performance. My focus on the financial expert directors 
is based on the belief that directors with sufficient financial knowledge are better able to 
assess and understand managers’ private information and are more capable of overseeing 
the financial reporting process than nonfinancial expert directors. I hypothesize that when 
future performance is poor, audit committee financial experts would intervene in accruals 
adjustment to beat the target, and the impact of financial experts on the odds of accruals 
adjustment to beat the target is stronger when future performance is poor than when 
future performance is strong. Consistent with my predictions, I find that the presence of 
at least one independent financial expert on the audit committee is negatively related to 
the use of accruals to beat analyst forecasts when the firm has next quarter’s earnings 
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below analyst forecasts. In addition, the negative effect of financial experts on the odds of 
beating the target by adjusting accruals is greater for firms with negative earnings 
surprises than for firms with positive earnings surprises in quarter t+1.  
 I also examine the impact of accounting experts on the quality of accruals. One of 
the most controversial issues of Section 407 of SOX is the operationalization of who is a 
financial expert. I find that the presence of both accounting and nonaccounting expertise 
on the audit committee is associated with higher quality of accruals. This evidence is 
consistent with prior studies and suggests that the SEC’s wide-ranging definition of 
financial expertise may not be a compromise to allay public criticism but rather reflects 
the need for broader (i.e., financial and supervisory) expertise on the board.  
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS 
Variables Measures 
Accruals Measurements 
ACTUAL Actual earnings per shares from I/B/E/S. 
ACCR Total accruals for firm i year t quarter q, which is measured as income 
before extraordinary items (IBCY) minus cash flow from continuing 
operations (XIDOCY+OANCFY), scaled by total assets (ATQ) for 
firm i year t quarter q-1 
AdjFE Forecast error adjusted for discretionary accrual for firm i year t 
quarter q, which is defined as the difference between nondiscretionary 
EPS (Define below) and median consensus analyst forecasts from 
I/B/E/S. 
DAC Discretionary accrual for firm i year t quarter q, which is defined as 
the difference between total accruals and estimated nondiscretionary 
accruals. Nondiscretionary accruals are estimated using a modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). The following cross-sectional 
model is run by year, quarter and two-digit SIC code: 
E 	,, = α + β 

	,, + β 
∆∆
	,,  + β 

	,,  
ACCRitq   = total accruals ( Defined above) 
TAit,q-1        = total assets (ATQ) for firm i year t quarter q-1 
∆REVitq   = change in net revenues(SALEQ)for firm i year t quarter q 
∆RECitq   = change in accounts receivable (RECTQ) for firm i year t 
quarter q 
∆GPPEitq = gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGTQ) for firm i 
year t quarter q 
The estimated coefficients from this regression are then used to 
compute nondiscretionary accruals for each firm as follows: 
  
FE Forecast error for firm i year t quarter q, which is defined as the 
difference between actual EPS and median consensus analyst forecast 
from I/B/E/S. 
NDEPS Nondiscretionary earnings per share for firm i year t quarter q, which 
is measured as actual EPS before recognizing discretionary accruals. 
MEDEST Median value of consensus analyst forecast from I/B/E/S. 
 
Board Measurements 
 
BOARD_SIZE Log(1+Number of directors on the board) 
BOARD_IND Log(1+Number of independent directors on the board)  
AC_SIZE Log(1+Number of audit committee members) 
AC_IND Log(1+Number of independent audit committee members) 
FEDIR1 Dummy variable equals to one if there is at least one independent 
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financial expert on the audit committee and zero otherwise. 
FEONLY1 Dummy variable equals to one if there is one independent financial 
expert on the audit committee and zero otherwise. 
FEMORE1 Dummy variable equals to one if there is at more than one 
independent financial expert on the audit committee and zero 
otherwise. 
ACCDIR1 Dummy variable equals to one if there is at least one independent 
accounting expert on the audit committee and zero otherwise. 
NonACC_FEDIR1 Dummy variable equals to one if there is at least one independent 
non-accounting expert on the audit committee and zero otherwise. 
 
Other Control Variables 
 
ABNOA Abnormal net operating assets for firm i year t quarter q, which is 
measured as NOA (Defined Below) less the median value pooled 
over the sample period.  
BTM Book to market ratio for firm i year t quarter q, which is calculated as 
shareholders’ equity (CEQQ) dividend by market value 
(PRCCQ*CSHOQ) at the end of fiscal quarter. 
CAPTIAL Dummy variable equals one when the capital expenditure (CAPXY) 
for firm i year t quarter q is less than industry median for a given 
year, and zero otherwise. 
CFO Cash flows from continuing operations for firm i year t quarter q, 
measured as extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(Statement of Cash Flows) plus operating activities 
(XIDOCY+OANCFY), scaled by total assets (ATQ) for quarter t-1 
CEO_TENURE Number of years that current CEO serves in company (Log Value) 
DECROA Dummy variable equals one when ROA for firm i year t quarter q 
before discretionary accruals is less than ROA for quarter q-1, and 
zero otherwise 
COMPANY_AGE Number of years company has been in business (Log value) 
CV_AF Coefficient on variation of the consensus forecast used to calculate 
earnings surprise for firm i year t quarter q, which is defined as 
standard deviation scaled by the mean. 
LEVERAGE Dummy variable equals one if long term debt (DLTTQ) for firm i 
year t quarter q, scaled by total assets (ATQ) for quarter t-1, is greater 
than the median value pooled over the sample period, and zero 
otherwise. 
  
DOWN_REV Analyst downward revision for firm i year t quarter q, which equals 
one if at least one of the firm’s analysts revised his or her forecast 
downward in the three months prior to the earnings announcement for 
quarter t, and zero otherwise. 
EARN Earnings for firm i year t quarter q, measured as income before 
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extraordinary Items (IBCY), scaled by total assets (ATQ) for quarter 
t-1. 
SIZEDUMMY FIRMSIZE equals 1 if firm size for firm i year t quarter q is greater 
than the median for that year; and 0 otherwise. 
LOSS Dummy variable which equals one if the firm has negative earnings 
(NIQ) in for firm i year t quarter q. 
LOG_ATQ Log value of total assets for firm i year t quarter q (ATQ). 
NOA Net operating assets for firm i year t quarter q, which is measured as 
shareholders’ equity (CEQQ) minus cash and marketable securities 
(CHEQ), plus total debt (DLCQ+DLTTQ), scaled by sales (SALEQ). 
NUM_ESTIMATE Number of analysts for firm i year t quarter q, which is measured as 
number of analysts whose forecasts are included in the consensus 
forecast used to calculate earnings surprise. 
R&D Dummy variable equals one when the R&D expenditure (XRDQ) for 
firm i year t quarter q is less than industry median for a given year, 
and zero otherwise.  
SEGMENT  Number of business segment and geographic segments (Log value) 
SIZE Size of the firm for firm i year t quarter q, which is measured as 
natural logarithm of market value (PRCCQ*CSHOQ). 
SHARES Number of common shares (CSHOQ) outstanding for firm i year t 
quarter q. 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLES 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: Full Sample   
 
Firm-
quarters 
Total Compustat firm-quarters from 2004-2011   336,457 
Missing data on total assets (ATQ) and SIC code (SICH)   (105,546) 
Financial, utility and unclassible industry   (73,231) 
Without enough data to calculate discretionary accruals  (69,384) 
Without board data on Corporate Library/RiskMetrics  (41,832) 
Without forecast data on IBES   (18,594) 
Without enough four quarter data for a given year and without 
enough data to calculate performance and/or control variables   (10,498) 
Truncate all continuous variables by top and bottom 1 %  (2,714) 
  14,658 
  
 
Panel B: Sample used in the analyses 
 
 #Firms Firm-quarters 
Firms that had earnings before DAC just miss analyst forecasts 783 1,460 
        Firms that use accruals to beat the target 500 1,091 
        Firms that choose to miss the target 283 369 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Compustata sample and test sample 
 
 
Compustat Sample Test Sample 
 N Mean STD Median N Mean STD Media
n 
SIZE  86,834 5.33*** 2.40 5.37 1,460 7.55 1.33 7.42 
LOG_ATQ 86,834 5.13*** 2.67 5.30 1,460 7.24 1.31 7.20 
EARN 86,834 -0.08*** 
0.41 0.005 1,460 0.01 0.03 0.01 
DAC 86,834 0.010** 0.16 0.0004 1,460 0.001 0.10 0.0003 
 
Panel B: Firms with earnings before discretionary accruals below forecast by less than one cent 
 
 Beat the Target Miss the Target 
 
N Mean STD Median N Mean STD Median 
Accruals Measures         
         
Discretionary Accruals (DAC)  1,091 0.003*** 0.008 0.001 369 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 
Nondiscretionary EPS (NDEPS)  1,091 0.352** 0.306 0.299 369 0.302 0.303 0.240 
Actual EPS (ACTUAL) 1,091 0.356*** 0.306 0.310 369 0.300 0.302 0.240 
Consensus Analyst Forecast (MEDEST) 1,091 0.354** 0.306 0.300 369 0.310 0.302 0.250 
Forecast error adjusted for DAC 
(AdjFE) 
1,091 -
0.001*** 
0.002 -0.000 369 -0.007 0.303 -0.000 
Forecast Error (FE) 1,091 0.001*** 0.007 0.000 369 -0.009 0.004 -0.010 
         
Board Characteristics         
         
BOARD_SIZE 1,091 11.18 4.02 10.00 369 11.34 4.14 10.00 
BOARD_IND 1,091 7.42 2.86 7.00 369 7.52 3.00 7.00 
AC_SIZE 1,091 3.68 0.88 3.00 369 3.78 0.99 4.00 
# of Financial Expert 1,091 1.62 1.97 1.00 369 1.61 1.09 1.00 
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# of Independent Financial Expert 1,091 1.55 1.08 1.00 369 1.56 1.07 1.00 
# of Accounting Expert 1,091 0.14 0.38 0.00 369 0.13 0.36 0.00 
# of Independent Accounting Expert 1,091 0.13 0.36 0.00 369 0.13 0.36 0.00 
Panel C: Financial Experts on Firms with earnings before discretionary accruals below forecast by less than one cent 
 
 Beat the Target Miss the Target 
   
 # % # % 
Independent Financial Expert=0 112 10.26 27 6.82 
Independent Financial Expert=1 556 50.97 204 55.28 
Independent Financial Expert>1 423 38.77 138 37.40 
     
Total Firms 1,091 100 369 100 
     
Panel D: Accounting Experts on Firms with earnings before discretionary accruals below forecast by less than one cent 
 
 Beat the Target Miss the Target 
 # % # % 
Independent Accounting 
Expert=0 934 85.62 316 85.63 
Independent Accounting 
Expert=1 142 13.01 49 13.27 
Independent Accounting 
Expert>1 15 1.37 4 1.10 
     
Total Firms 1,091 100 369 100 
 
The descriptive statistics are based on 1,460 firm-quarter observations in the period 2004-2011 excluding firm do not have 
quarterly earnings data for all quarters of the given year. I delete all firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
from 4400-5000 (utility industry), 6000-6999 (financial services) and 9000-9999 (unclassible industry). 1,091 firm-quarter 
observations have earnings before discretionary accruals initially below forecasts by less than one cent but reports sufficient 
positive discretionary accruals that allow earnings to beat analyst forecasts. 369 firm-quarter observations have earnings before 
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discretionary accruals initially below forecasts by less than one cent and report earnings that is below analyst forecasts. See 
Appendix A for variable measurements. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation  
 
 
BOARD_IN
D 
# Independent 
Financial 
Expert 
# Financial 
Expert 
# Independent 
Accounting 
Expert 
# Accounting 
Expert Firm Size 
 
      
BOARD_SIZE 0.825 0.177 0.158 0.106 0.116 0.302 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
     
 
BOARD_IND 
 0.211 0.236 0.0923 0.0819 0.357 
 
 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
      
# Independent 
Financial Expert    
0.972 
<0.0001 
0.113 
<0.0001 
0.116 
<0.0001 
0.211 
<0.0001 
 
  
  
  
# Financial Expert 
   0.127 0.106 0.204 
    0.007 <0.0001 <0.0001 
       
# Independent 
Accounting Expert     
0.963 
<0.0001 
0.0367 
0.160 
 
      
# Accounting Expert 
     0.192 
 
     <0.0001 
 
The correlations are based on 1,460 firm-quarter observations in the period 2004-2011 excluding firm do not have quarterly 
earnings data for all quarters of the given year. I delete all firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 4400-
5000 (utility industry), 6000-6999 (financial services) and 9000-9999 (unclassible industry). See Appendix A for variable 
measures.
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Table 4. Test of H1 
 
  
JUSTBEAT t-statistics 
  
  
    
FEDIR1t (-)      -0.687*** [-5.069] 
SIZEt  0.040 [0.323] 
BTMt (-) 0.272 [1.316] 
SHARESt (+) 0.000 [0.365] 
NUM_ESTIMATEt (+)       0.045*** [3.604] 
CV_AFt (-) 0.359 [1.163] 
DOWN_REVt (+) -0.273 [-1.160] 
BOARD_SIZEt   -0.446* [-1.759] 
BOARD_INDt  0.001 [0.0276] 
AC_SIZEt  -0.122 [-0.393] 
    
Observations  1460  
Pseudo R2  0.101   
    
Year & Quarter Fixed Effect  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes  
    
 
The dependent variable is JUSTBEAT, which equals one when a firm whose earnings 
before discretionary accruals is initially below forecasts by less than one cent but reports 
sufficient positive discretionary accruals that allow earnings to beat analyst forecasts, and 
zero when a firm whose earnings before discretionary accruals is initially below forecasts 
by less than one cent and reports earnings that is still below analyst forecasts. See 
Appendix A for variable measures. All regressions are estimated with an intercept 
included but the intercept is not reported. t-Statistics shown in brackets are based on 
robust standard errors cluster by year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Test of H2 
 
   JUSTBEAT t-statistics 
     
     
Constant (+) α0 0.870 [-1.360] 
FEDIR1t  β0 -0.280 [-4.351] 
BadNEWSt*FEDIR1t (-) β1      -0.808*** [2.784] 
BadNEWSt (+) β2       0.397*** [0.201] 
SIZEt   0.026 [1.388] 
BTMt (-)  0.290 [0.417] 
SHARESt (+)  0.000 [3.989] 
NUM_ESTIMATEt (+)        0.047*** [1.128] 
CV_AFt (-)  0.369 [-1.004] 
DOWN_REVt (+)  -0.231 [-1.506] 
BOARD_SIZEt   -0.416 [-0.362] 
BOARD_INDt   -0.008 [-0.237] 
AC_SIZEt   -0.076 [0.695] 
     
     
Observations   1460  
Pseudo R2   0.105  
     
Year & Quarter Fixed Effect   Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes  
     
Coefficient on  β0+β1   -1.088***  
 
The dependent variable is JUSTBEAT. BadNEWS is a dummy variable that equals one if 
a firm fails to beat analyst forecasts in the following quarter, and zero otherwise. See 
Appendix A for variable measures. t-Statistics shown in brackets are based on robust 
standard errors cluster by year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Accounting Expertise on the Audit Committee 
 
 
 
 JUSTBEAT t-statistics 
 
 
   
 
 
   
ACCDIR1t  β0 0.152 [0.654] 
BadNEWSt*ACCDIR1t  β1     -0.687** [-2.012] 
NonACC_FEDIR1t  β2 -0.246 [-1.590] 
BadNEWSt* NonACC_FEDIR1t β3    -0.533** [-2.260] 
BadNEWSt      0.293* [1.750] 
SIZEt   -0.042 [-0.276] 
BTMt (-)        0.325*** [2.666] 
SHARESt (+)  0.001 [0.487] 
NUM_ESTIMATEt (+)        0.045*** [3.043] 
CV_AFt (-)  0.408 [0.996] 
DOWN_REVt (+)  -0.109 [-0.363] 
BOARD_SIZEt   -0.507 [-1.538] 
BOARD_INDt   -0.001 [-0.0526] 
AC_SIZEt   0.157 [0.427] 
     
Observations   1106  
Pseudo R2   0.125  
     
Year & Quarter Fixed Effect   Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes  
 
The dependent variable is JUSTBEAT. ACCDIR1 is dummy variable equals one when 
there is at least one independent accounting expert on the audit committee, and zero 
otherwise NonACC_FRDIR1 is dummy variable equals one when there is at least one 
independent non-accounting financial expert on the audit committee, and zero otherwise. 
See Appendix A for variable measures. All regressions are estimated with an intercept 
included but the intercept is not reported. t-Statistics shown in brackets are based on 
robust standard errors cluster by year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7. The Predictive Ability of Accruals  
 
  
 EARNt+1 t-statistics 
  
 
 
 
  
   
CFOt (+) β1       0.582*** [12.81] 
ACCRt (+) β2      0.315*** [11.55] 
CFOt*FEDIR1t  β3 0.053 [1.071] 
ACCRUALt*FEDIR1t (+) β4     0.159** [2.800] 
     
Observations   14658  
Adjusted R2   0.381  
     
Year & Quarter Fixed Effect   Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes  
 
The dependent variable is EARNt+1. See Appendix A for variable measures. All 
regressions are estimated with an intercept included but the intercept is not reported. t-
Statistics shown in brackets are based on robust standard errors cluster by year.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. The Magnitude of Discretionary Accruals  
 
 BOARD_IND AC_IND FEDIR1 
   (1) (2) (3) 
    
 
BOARD_VARt (-) -0.001* -0.004** 0.002 
 [-2.052] [-2.527] [0.194] 
SIZEt  0.031 0.029 0.031 
 [0.625] [0.592] [0.635] 
LOG(ATQ)t  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 [-1.624] [-1.479] [-1.593] 
BTMt  -0.204 -0.203 -0.204 
 [-1.787] [-1.780] [-1.786] 
CFOt  0.025* 0.025* 0.025* 
  [2.412] [2.411] [2.410] 
DECROAt  0.005 0.005 0.005 
 [0.308] [0.296] [0.304] 
ABN_NOAt-1  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 [-1.730] [-1.739] [-1.728] 
LEVERAGEt  -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 [-1.493] [-1.534] [-1.499] 
SHARESt  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.403] [1.425] [1.344] 
BOARD_SIZEt  0.023** 0.018** 0.015* 
 
 [2.778] [2.495] [2.170] 
     
Observations  14,515 14,515 14,515 
R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Year & Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
The dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DAC), which is followed Modified 
Jones Model.  BOARD_VAR measures include BOARD_IND,AC_IND, and FEDIR1. 
See Appendix A for variable measures. All the regressions are estimated with an intercept 
included but the intercept is not reported. t-Statistics shown in brackets are based on 
robust standard errors cluster by year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. More Than One Independent Financial Expert  
 
 JUSTBEA
T 
t-
statistics JUSTBEAT 
t-statistics 
 (1)  (2)  
        
FEONLY1t β0   -0.315 [-1.344]      -0.665*** [-3.218] 
FEONLY1t_BadNEWSt  
β1        -
0.676*** [-2.763]    -0.376** [-2.138] 
FEMORE1t β2  -0.146 [-0.534] 
FEMORE1t_BadNEWSt β3       -1.002*** [-3.917] 
BadNEWSt      0.377** [2.034]      0.393*** [2.759] 
SIZEt  -0.073 [-0.607] 0.021 [0.164] 
BTMt  0.319 [1.139] 0.285 [1.378] 
SHARESt  0.001 [0.941] 0.000 [0.432] 
NUM_ESTIMATEt      0.040** [2.134]      0.048*** [4.102] 
CV_AFt  0.032 [0.0500] 0.378 [1.137] 
DOWN_REVt  0.010 [0.0269] -0.232 [-1.006] 
BOARD_SIZEt  -0.410 [-0.825] -0.408 [-1.379] 
BOARD_INDt  0.008 [0.197] -0.010 [-0.417] 
AC_SIZEt  -0.250 [-0.406] -0.070 [-0.216] 
 
    
Observations  885  1460  
Pseudo R2  0.116  0.107  
 
    
Year & Quarter Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes  Yes  
 
The dependent variable is JUSTBEAT. FEONLY1 is dummy variable equals one when 
there is one independent accounting expert on the audit committee, and zero otherwise 
FEMORE1 is dummy variable equals one when there is more than one independent non-
accounting financial expert on the audit committee, and zero otherwise. See Appendix A 
for variable measures. All regressions are estimated with an intercept included but the 
intercept is not reported. t-Statistics shown in brackets are based on robust standard errors 
cluster by year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10. Matched Sample  
 
 Beat t-statistics 
      
FEDIRt β0    0.688** [2.337] 
FEDIR1t_BadNEWSt  β1      -1.063*** [-4.333] 
BadNEWSt  -0.055 [-0.400] 
SIZEt   0.097* [1.704] 
BTMt     -0.297* [-1.673] 
SHARESt  -0.000 [-0.294] 
NUM_ESTIMATEt      0.036** [2.201] 
CV_AFt   0.166 [1.455] 
DOWN_REVt  -0.212 [-1.244] 
BOARD_SIZEt        -0.648*** [-3.489] 
BOARD_INDt  0.021 [1.284] 
AC_SIZEt  -0.192 [-0.960] 
 
 -0.037 [-0.0689] 
Observations   
Pseudo R2  1760  
 
  
Year & Quarter Fixed Effect  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes  
   
Coefficient on  β2+β3       -0.375***  
 
The regression are based on 880 firm-quarter observations whose earnings before 
discretionary accruals is initially below forecasts but reports sufficient positive 
discretionary accruals that allow earnings to beat analyst forecasts and their matched 
observations based on two-digit SIC codes, prior quarter net operating assets and year. 
The dependent variable BEAT equals one when a firm has earnings before discretionary 
accruals below forecasts but reports sufficient positive discretionary accruals that allow 
earnings to beat analyst forecasts, and zero when a firm has earnings before discretionary 
accruals below forecasts and reports earnings that is still below analyst forecasts. See 
Appendix A for variable measures. All regressions are estimated with an intercept 
included but the intercept is not reported. t-Statistics shown in brackets are based on 
robust standard errors cluster by year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
Panel A: First-stage Model of the Determinants of the presence of at least an 
Independent Financial Expert 
 FEDIR1 t-statistics 
   
 0.028 [1.122] 
SIZEt   0.075* [2.171] 
BTMt -0.000 [-0.909] 
SHARESt 0.001 [0.298] 
NUM_ESTIMATEt 0.024 [0.825] 
CV_AFt   0.045* [1.924] 
DOWN_REVt    -0.189** [-2.950] 
BOARD_SIZEt     0.018*** [3.670] 
BOARD_INDt -0.086 [-0.750] 
AC_SIZEt -0.012 [-0.556] 
SIZEDUMMYt 0.008 [0.974] 
COMPANY_AGE 0.007 [0.815] 
FCFt -0.003 [-0.833] 
R&Dt 0.001 [0.789] 
CAPITALt   0.024* [1.914] 
SEGMENTt 0.028 [1.122] 
CEO_TENUREt  0.075* [2.171] 
LEVERAGEt -0.000 [-0.909] 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.353  
Year & Quarter Fixed 
Effect Yes 
 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  
 See Appendix A for variable measures. All regressions are estimated with an intercept 
included but the intercept is not reported. t-Statistics shown in brackets are based on 
robust standard errors cluster by year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B Second-stage Regression of the presence of at least an Independent Financial  
Expert on the Odds of Beating Analyst Forecast by Accruals Contingent on Future 
Earnings Surprises 
 
   BEAT t-statistics 
   
  
*+,-.1!0   β0 -7.431 [-1.564] *+,-.1!0 *BadNEWSt (-) β1 -1.947*** [-2.842] 
BadNEWSt   1.536*** [2.851] 
SIZEt   0.273 [1.337] 
BTMt   1.016*** [3.238] 
SHARESt (-)  -0.000 [-0.0609] 
NUM_ESTIMATEt   0.044* [1.951] 
CV_AFt (+)  0.318 [0.876] 
DOWN_REVt   0.049 [0.113] 
BOARD_SIZEt (+)  -2.469** [-2.364] 
BOARD_INDt   0.144 [1.155] 
AC_SIZEt (-)  -0.836 [-1.222] 
     
Observations (+)  887  
Pseudo R2 
 
 0.412  
Year & Quarter Fixed Effect   Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect   Yes  
Coefficients on β0+β1   -9.377*  
 
The dependent variable is BEAT. Predicted FEDIR1 is the predicted value of FEDIR1 in 
the first-stage model (Panel A). See Appendix A for variable measures. All regressions 
are estimated with an intercept included but the intercept is not reported. t-Statistics 
shown in brackets are based on robust standard errors cluster by year. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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